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On Cores and Equilibria of Productive 
Economies with a Measure Space of Consumers: 
An Example 
In a market economy where production and consumption decisions are 
decentralized and where coalitions exercise control over production 
possibilities, an equilibirum concept has to supply a satisfactory solution 
as to how profits are distributed. If all production possibility sets are 
cones, maximal profits at any equilibrium will be zero. Hence, the budget 
constraint of any consumer will be determined by the value of his endow- 
ment alone. A problem of profit distribution does not exist. In the general 
case, stability considerations with respect to possible actions of coalitions 
do require that at the equilibrium the profit distribution should guarantee 
to each coalition a payment at least as high as the maximal profit relative 
to its production possibility set. These considerations led to the formula- 
tion of an equilibrium with a stable profit distribution as proposed in [2] 
and [4]. 
In his 1968 article [3] Hildenbrand showed that for an economy with 
an atomless measure space of consumers the core and the set of equilibrium 
allocations coincide if production possibility sets are additive. This was 
the natural extension of Aumann’s earlier result in [I]. It is easily seen 
that the notion of equilibrium used by Hildenbrand is a special case of an 
equilibrium with a stable profit distribution. However, as the following 
example shows, one cannot hope to obtain an equivalence result even in 
the zero profit case if the production correspondence is strictly super- 
additive. 
Let the set of consumers A be the interval [0, I] and ‘8 all its Bore1 
subsets with Lebesgue measure p. Let (S, , S,) be a partition of [0, I] such 
that p(S,) = p(S,) = l/2. The commodity space is Rt , and endowments 
are constant on A such that 
s 
edp= (2,0) 
A 
The preference relations for the members of the two coalitions S, and S, 
are depicted in Figs. 1 and 2 and are defined by 
mid(W) x1 , x2 + l/2) 
%W = i3. 
minKV2) x1 , x2> 
for x1 > l/2, x2 3 l/4 
otherwise 
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for a ES, and by U,(X) = min {x, , x2} for a ES,. The production cor- 
respondence Y(.) is given by Y(S) = {y E R2 I y < (-z1 , z2), z1 > 0, 
z, > 0, z, = 2&S n S&}. Y is strictly super-additive and only those 
coalitions which contain subcoalitions of S, with positive measure are 
able to produce positive amounts of commodity two. 
It is easy to verify that the allocation f : A -+ R: with f(a) = (1, 1) for 
all a E A, p = (1, l), and y = (- 1, 1) is the only competitive equilibrium 
with sup p.Y(S) = 0 for all S C A. On the other hand, it will be shown 
that the allocation g : A + R? such that g(a) = (2,2) for a ES, and 
g(a) = (0,O) for a E S, is unblocked. 
Suppose there exists a coalition S, p(S) > 0, which blocks g using an 
allocation h and production bundle y E Y(S). Clearly, S # A, SC S, , 
S Q S, . The remaining case which has to be considered is p(S n S,) > 0 
and p(S n S,) > 0. Without loss of generality one may assume that 
Since h(u) >, g(a) a.e. a E S 
and 
M4 > 2 
a.e. aesns, 
M4 > 2 
h(u) > 0 a.e. a E S n S, 
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Hence 
s h, > 2&S n S,> s 
However, 
I s hl = 2ds1 - 2p& s > j hz > 2p(S n &) 2 s 
implies 2p(S n S,) 2&S n S,) > J h, . 
Since 2&S n S,) ,( 1, Js h, -C 2p(S n S,). Hence h cannot be a blocking 
allocation for S. 
With a few minor changes in the assumptions the example has a clear 
geometric representation which has been given in Fig. 3. Assume that 
A = LO, 21 instead of the unit interval, that for the fixed partition (S, , S,) 
,u(SJ = ,LL(&) = I holds, and that the production correspondence is given 
by Y(S) = {y E R2 I y d (-21, 4, z1 > 0, z, > 0, ~2 = p(S n &)z,l 
2,. ors, 
FIGURE 3 
412 BOEHM 
Furthermore, J edp = (4,O) where e is constant on A. The only equilibrium 
allocation is again f(a) = (1, 1) for all a E A at prices p = (1, 1) and 
production bundle y = (-2, 2). In Fig. 3 the set {Y(A) + ((4,O))) n R+2 
is the set of aggregate, attainable consumption vectors. OABC is the 
appropriate ‘Edgeworth box’ for the production y = (-2, 2) represented 
by B .O and B have been chosen as the origins of the typical consumption 
sets for a E S, and for a E S, , respectively. D represents the equilibrium 
allocation. On the other hand, the allocation g : A --j R+2 such that 
g(a) = (0,O) for a E S, and g(a) = (2,2) for a E S, represented by point 0 
is unblocked. 
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